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Abstract
It has long been noted that Natural Language utterances can communicate more than their con-
ventional meaning (Grice, 1975). It has also been noted that behaving appropriately in response to
instructions given in Natural Language requires understanding more than their conventional meaning
(Suppes and Crangle, 1988; Webber and Di Eugenio, 1990; Webber et al., 1992). This paper addresses
one mechanism by which speakers convey, and hearers derive, such additional aspects of meaning { a
mechanism we call pragmatic overloading. In pragmatic overloading, a clause interpreted as conveying
directly or indirectly the goal  of an action  which is described by some other clause, forms the basis
of constrained inference that leads to additional information about the action . The paper demon-
strates pragmatic overloading through a variety of clausal adjuncts. We then discuss a framework that
supports many of the inferences that pragmatic overloading gives rise to. This framework integrates a
lexical semantics representation a la Jackendo (1990) with a knowledge representation system, CLAS-
SIC (Brachman et al., 1991), based on description logic. We give examples of its use, before concluding
with a discussion of future work.
1 Introduction
It has long been noted that Natural Language utterances can communicate more than their conventional
meaning (Grice, 1975). It has also been noted that behaving appropriately in response to Natural Language
instructions requires that more than their conventional meaning be understood (Suppes and Crangle, 1988;
Webber and Di Eugenio, 1990; Webber et al., 1992). For example, consider what a hearer
1
must know to
carry out each of the following instructions:
(1a) Carry the beakers carefully.
(1b) Go to the mirror and x your hair.
In Ex. (1a), a hearer must derive from \carefully", constraints on his behavior that will keep the beakers
from breaking and their contents from spilling. In Ex. (1b), the hearer must derive from \to the mirror"
and \x your hair", a location in front of the mirror that will enable him to see his hair clearly.
It is not that equivalent inferences can not be drawn from corresponding declarative sentences:
1
(2a) Mary carried the beakers carefully.
(2b) Fred went to the mirror and xed his hair.
And it is not that other inferences cannot be drawn from Ex. (2a) and (2b) either. It is that in the case of
instructions to behave appropriately, particular behavior-related inferencesmust be drawn if the information
is not otherwise provided.
2
It is here that the core linguistic-pragmatic notion of relevance (Grice, 1975;
Wilson and Sperber, 1986) comes into play: it is because they are needed to behave appropriately that these
inferences are relevant.
In this paper we discuss a particular constrained mechanism by which speakers convey, and hearers derive,
additional aspects of meaning. We call this mechanism pragmatic overloading . In pragmatic overloading, a
clause interpreted as conveying directly or indirectly the goal  of an action  described by another clause
forms the basis of constrained inference that leads to additional information about that action. In Sec. 3, we
demonstrate pragmatic overloading through a variety of clausal adjuncts that perform double duty: explicitly,
they convey one specic relation R between the action described in the main clause  and the action  or
state  described in the adjunct; implicitly, they rene the interpretation of , producing a more specic
action description 
0
, or they rene the interpretation of R.
The reader should note that we are not describing a fully implemented system. A prototype system,
AnimNL for Animation and Natural Language (Webber et al., 1992; Webber et al., 1995), does exist (Sec. 2
and Sec. 4), and embodies our attempt to use instructions to guide the task-related behavior of animated
human gures. The algorithm described in Sec. 4 is implemented within this system, but it is able to handle
only some of the input constructions discussed in Sec. 3 that give rise to pragmatic overloading. However,
we claim that the representation and reasoning we propose in Sec. 4 provide solid theoretical and practical
foundations for further development of the system.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we briey describe AnimNL and Jack
R
, the animation system
on which AnimNL is based. Sec. 3 describes pragmatic overloading , dierentiating it from other pragmatic
inferences, and provides the empirical evidence for it. Sec. 4 then discusses a Knowledge Representation
framework that integrates a lexical semantics representation (Jackendo, 1990) with a system based on
description logic (Brachman et al., 1991). We demonstrate that those two components provide an elegant
way of supporting many of the inferences that pragmatic overloading gives rise to. Finally, we conclude with
a note on how the work described here is now proceeding.
A comment on notation: given that we will discuss adjuncts, we will reserve the symbol  to the action
described in the main clause, and the symbols  and  to the object described in the adjunct,  for an
action,  for a state. R is the relation holding between  and  or .
2 Animation from NL instructions
The work described here has been done in connection with an ongoing project at the University of Pennsylva-
nia called AnimNL for Animation and Natural Language, aimed at enabling users to guide the task-related
behavior of animated human gures through NL instructions (Webber et al., 1992; Badler, Phillips, and
Webber, 1993; Badler et al., 1993; Webber et al., 1995; Webber, 1995). AnimNL builds upon Jack
R
, an
animation system developed by the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Human Modeling and Simula-
tion. In Jack, animation follows from model-based simulation of virtual agents acting in an environment.
The agents of primary interest are Jack's biomechanically reasonable and anthropometrically scaled human
models | see Fig. 1, which shows Jack at a soda fountain. In task-related behavior, the movements of these
Figure 1: Jack at a soda fountain
animated human gures result from the interaction of at least four dierent factors:
 a growing repertoire of built-in behaviors such as walking, obstacle avoidance, stepping, turning, grasp-
ing, strength-guided lifting, etc. (Badler, Phillips, and Webber, 1993), that remove responsibility from
either Natural Language understanding or high-level planning to control all behavior from \above".
Each of these behaviors is environmentally reactive in the sense that incremental computations during
simulation are able to adjust an agent's performance to the situation without further involvement of
the higher level processes (Becket and Badler, 1993; Badler et al., 1995) unless an exceptional failure
condition is signaled;
 intentions and expectations an agent adopts in response to understanding its given instructions, or
apropos its current stage in a task (Webber et al., 1995);
 knowledge given to an agent of how to act in dierent environments in order to try to satisfy the
intentions it adopts (Geib, 1995);
 limitations established on agent \perception": visual \perception" is limited to objects within a
bounded space that are not otherwise obstructed. Currently, research is being carried out on a model
of \perception" that distinguishes between what is available to an agent through foveal vision versus
peripheral vision (Chopra, 1994), which will support more realistic focus and shifts of attention during
task performance and other environmental changes.
Jack is described in more detail in (Badler, Phillips, and Webber, 1993; Becket and Badler, 1993). We will
come back to AnimNL in Sec. 4.2.
3 Pragmatic Overloading
The term overloading has been used before in other contexts. In programming languages, an operator is said
to be overloaded if it can be used for more than one purpose. For example, in many programming languages,
\+" is overloaded, indicating both integer and real addition. In the context of AI planning, Pollack (1991)
has used the term overloading to refer to cases where a single intention to act is used to wholly or partially
satisfy several of an agent's goals simultaneously.
Our use of overloading is closer to Pollack's. It diers in that we are concerned with a communicative
domain, that involves two agents, a speaker and a hearer. The speaker, knowing that some necessary
information regarding how to act can be derived from knowing the purpose of acting, and believing that
the hearer will recognize that the information is both necessary and missing, relies on the hearer deriving
the missing information from her (the speaker's) expression of purpose. Thus we say that her expression
of purpose is pragmatically overloaded { both conveying purpose and leading the hearer to infer additional
constraints on his behavior.
As an example of pragmatic overloading , consider the instruction:
(3) Hold the cup under the spigot to ll it with coee.
The innitival adjunct here is an instance of a Purpose Clause. It both describes a goal  = ll the cup
with coee, and conveys a relation R between  and the action described in the main clause,  = hold the
cup under the spigot . For the moment, following (Grosz and Sidner, 1990), we will refer to R as contribute.
Notice that  does not specify how the cup should be held under the spigot { horizontally or vertically, and
if vertically, with the concavity pointing upwards or downwards. But also notice that  can lead the hearer
to appropriate constraints on that choice: to ll a cup with coee, the cup must be held vertically, with its
concavity pointing upwards. This constraint does not simply derive from default knowledge, but crucially
depends on the purpose  is performed for. This is clear from Ex. (4), where the given purpose does not
constrain cup orientation in the same way:
(4) Hold the cup under the faucet to wash it.
We claim that  can lead to additional constraints on  as a joint consequence of the fact that contribute
holds between  and , and the fact that the instructor intends the agent to recognize that such relation
holds. The Purpose Clause construction may then perform two functions: explicitly, it conveys the contribute
relation R; implicitly, it may constrain the interpretation of  or R. We therefore say it is pragmatically
overloaded .
Clauses other than Purpose Clauses can demonstrate pragmatic overloading as well. In instructions,
an until clause species the condition  an agent should monitor for, as a signal to terminate the process
denoted by the main clause . For example, consider the move action in Ex. (5):
(5) Have your helper move the tape sideways until the 4-foot mark on the tape coincides with the 5-foot
mark on the ruler .
Whether to move towards the left side or towards the right is not stated explicitly. Rather, the until clause
suggests the direction (i.e., the sideways direction that will bring the marks into alignment), as well as
specifying when the move action should terminate. Pragmatic overloading thus conveys a more rened
version 
0
of the action description  given in the main clause.
The additional information conveyed by  can also enable the agent to rene the contribute relation R
between  and . The particular renement we have noticed is the addition of expectations that the agent
will assume hold in order for  to contribute to . Consider:
(6) Open the box and hand me the yellow block.
The expectation here concerns the location of the referent of the NP the yellow block , that the agent expects
to nd inside the box. It is a constraint on the relation between  = open the box and  = hand me the
yellow block : it is under the condition that the yellow block is in the box that  enables , i.e. brings
about a condition necessary for  to be executable. Again, we can see pragmatic overloading at work: the
syntactic construction of purposive and (Doran, 1993) | for now, we have set aside the enormous complexity
deriving from the ambiguity of and | explicitly conveys a purpose relation, while implicitly giving rise to
this additional expectation.
For Pollack (1991), overloading intentions is a strategy for focusing means-end analysis. To demonstrate
where overloading \pays o", Pollack compares it to a strategy of complete deliberation. To demonstrate
the same of pragmatic overloading , we can compare it to providing the full descriptions 
0
or R
0
. We have
already invoked the Gricean notion of relevance. In a similar vein, the two strategies, overloading versus
full description, can be seen as corresponding respectively to Grice's Maxim of Manner (more specically,
the sub-maxim Be brief ) and his Maxim of Quantity (roughly, Provide exactly enough information as is
required for the current purposes of the exchange). Intuitively, pragmatic overloading will be employed when
its expected benets (reduced generation time on the part of the instructor and less text for the agent to
process) outweigh its expected costs (for the instructor, the cost of deciding what features of 
0
or R
0
can be
left out without risk that the agent will compute a wrong 
0
or R
0
, and for the agent, the cost of computing

0
or R
0
). In cases such as Ex. (5) above, where the only description of movement direction possible when
the instruction is issued is that it will bring the two marks into coincidence, a pragmatic overloading strategy
wins over full description.
Pragmatic overloading bears a resemblance to other phenomena discussed in the discourse processing
and plan recognition literature. In discourse processing, Moore and Pollack (1993) have shown that multiple
relations may simultaneously hold between two discourse elements, some being at the informational level of
analysis, others being at the intentional level. In their framework, pragmatic overloading is something that
would occur solely within the informational level: given a particular intentional level analysis of discourse
elements, pragmatic overloading accounts for multiple kinds of information relevant to the agent's behavior
they convey.
Reasoning similar to pragmatic overloading also occurs in plan recognition, which Kautz (1990) denes
as:
One is given a fragmented, impoverished description of the actions performed by one or more
agents, and expected to infer a rich, highly interrelated description. The new description lls
out details of the setting, and relates the actions of the agents in the scenario to their goals and
future actions.
While the renements eected by pragmatic overloading (
0
or R
0
) can be considered a more specic
description [that] lls out [some of] the details of the setting , plan recognition has generally been concerned
with inferring, from given observations, additional events that have not been directly observed. As such,
this process resembles Lewis' notion of accommodation (1979), which he denes as the process by which
the conversational score tends to evolve in such a way as is required in order to make whatever occurs
count as correct play. By conversational score, Lewis means the state of the conversation, given in terms
of components such as sets of presuppositions. Concretely, accommodation results in new \objects" being
added to the conversational score if this is required in order for the conversation to \make sense".
In linguistics, accommodation has primarily been invoked to account for presuppositions and novel def-
inites such as the door in \I went home. The door was ajar". Even if the door has never been talked
about, a referent for it is readily added to the conversational score. However, Lewis has also discussed a
hearer's accommodation of additional actions that enable a conversation to \make sense", much in the way
that plan recognition infers additional actions and a plan that \makes sense" of the observed actions. Prag-
matic overloading diers from accommodation in rening an entity's description rather than introducing
new entities: for example, we would ascribe inferring actions not mentioned in the input and necessary to
execute an instruction, e.g. depress the lever in (3), to accommodation (or plan recognition), and not to
pragmatic overloading. Resolving pragmatic overloading and handling accommodation appeal to dierent
types of constrained inference.
Much still remains to be explored as regards pragmatic overloading. What this paper addresses, as will
be explained in detail in the following sections, is inferences that
1. arise while mapping the input surface form to the symbolic knowledge the agent already has about 
and ;
2. thus arise at the level of interpretation, before the agent engages in executing the instructions.
While these inferences (like those of plan recognition) rely on the fact that the actions being talked about are
ones the agent is familiar with, they do accomplish two things: (1) they enable behavior-related information
to be conveyed implicitly, and (2) they allow for signicant variations in the way actions are described (see
Sec. 4).
The patterns of inference we associate with pragmatic overloading are schematically represented in Fig. 2,
where  corresponds to the goal description,  to the action description constrained by , and R to the
relation holding between  and . 
0
and R
0
correspond to the more rened descriptions that the hearer
infers: examples where 
0
is inferred are (3) and (5), while R
0
is inferred in Ex. (6). Note that Fig. 2 suggests
a third possible kind of renement | where the goal description  is rened to a more specic description

0
. Although we have not yet found any naturally occurring examples of such phenomenon, see (Di Eugenio,
1993, pp.87, 147) for some considerations in this respect.
αα
’
R’ = Contribute +
         Expectations
ββ
R = Contribute
α
Figure 2: Two types of description renement
To motivate the form of representation and reasoning presented in Sec. 4, we will show how in purpose
clauses | Do  to do  | and gerundive free adjuncts | Do , doing  | further specication of  and/or
R follows directly from recognizing  as the intended reason for . We also show how in until clauses |
Do  until  | further specication of  follows indirectly from linking the termination condition  of 
with its goal. The cases are complementary in that, if  in Do  to do  species a process, then  can
be interpreted as constraining its termination condition. On the other hand  in Do  until  can often be
construed as conveying the goal that  should achieve, as well as its termination condition.
The data was collected from four how-to-do books, (Hallowell, 1988b; Hallowell, 1988a; RD, 1991; Mc-
Gowan and DuBern, 1991). As noted earlier, we will use  to refer to the action description in the main
clause and  and  to the action () or state () description in the adjunct. In addition, we will use
expressions such as executing / to mean executing the action denoted by /.
3.1 Direct expressions of purpose
3.1.1 Purpose Clauses
There are a variety of expressions that convey purpose, among them innitival constructions introduced by
(in order) to, for nominalizations, for gerunds (Vander Linden and Martin, 1995), subordinates introduced
by so that , such that , purposive and , and free adjuncts. Here we will mainly discuss Purpose Clauses |
PC's for short | innitival to constructions that occur in patterns such as Do  to do , or To do , do A,
where A is a sequence of actions. Our corpus consists of 230 instances of PC's.
3
A Purpose Clause is used to convey to the agent the goal  to whose achievement the execution of the
action denoted by  contributes. As mentioned above with respect to (3), very often the construction is
pragmatically overloaded , in that the goal  also constrains the interpretation of . Another example in
point is:
(7) Turn screw to loosen.
 = Turn screw is underspecied in that the direction in which to turn the screw is missing; the goal
 = to loosen provides such direction as counterclockwise, under the assumption the screw is right threaded.
4
Another example is:
(8) To treat badly corroded brass that is showing signs of verdigris, immerse it in a dip.
Here  = immerse it in a dip is underspecied, as clearly not any dip will achieve  = treat badly corroded
brass.
5
The type of dip is then determined by .
As noted in Sec. 1,  can also constrain the contribute relation R by creating expectations about object
locations that have to be true forR to hold between  and . Purpose clauses behave similar to the purposive
and illustrated in Ex. (6) in this regard. Consider:
(9a) [Stop by the library]

1
[to get me the Italian dictionary]

1
.
(9b) [Stop by the library]

2
[to return the Italian dictionary]

2
.
(9c) [Stop by the library]

3
[to buy me some vegetables]

3
.
In all three cases, 
i
= Stop by the library is interpreted as contributing to achieving 
i
. However, in (9a),
but not in (9b), the basic contribute relation is further constrained by a condition inferred from : the
expectation that the referent of the Italian dictionary is in the library. These expectations arise when 
changes the perceptual space the agent has access to from S to S', and this change of perceptual space is
interpreted as a necessary condition for  to be executed. Namely, if  is done with the purpose of doing
 and results in the agent having access to S
0
; and if  has among its requirements that a participant be
at S
0
for  to be relevant, then a locational expectation develops as in (9a). These expectations don't just
arise from world knowledge, as shown by the fact that in (9b), while the same natural association between
libraries and books is evoked, contrary to (9a) no expectation arises. On the other hand, it does arise in
(9c), when there isn't a natural association between libraries and vegetables or libraries and buying: that
is why the example seems so strange. Notice also that these expectations are necessary to correctly ground
referential NP's, namely, to resolve them against their correct referent in the world: if for example there is
an Italian dictionary in sight at the time the instruction is issued, it won't do if the agent hands it to the
speaker, on the grounds he has found a referent in the world satisfying the description of the referential NP
the Italian dictionary .
6
To solve this kind of cases, notions deriving from the planning literature, such as qualiers, are necessary
| see Sec. 4.
The Contribute relation. So far, we have mentioned that  contributes to achieving the goal . The
notion of contribution can be made more specic by examining naturally occurring purpose clauses. In the
majority of cases, they express generation, and in the rest enablement. What we will show is that pragmatic
overloading can occur in both cases, as long as the instructor intends the agent to recognize such relation.
Generation is a relation between actions that has been extensively studied, rst in philosophy (Goldman,
1970) and then in discourse analysis (Allen, 1984), (Pollack, 1986), (Grosz and Sidner, 1990), (Balkanski,
1993). Intuitively, if  generates , executing  in appropriate circumstances is all that is required to achieve
. This is formalized (see e.g. (Pollack, 1986; Balkanski, 1993)) by requiring that
1.  and  be simultaneous, where simultaneity has to be strictly interpreted to exclude cases in which
 is part of doing ;
2. when  occurs, a set of conditions C hold, such that the joint occurrence of  and C entail the occurrence
of . If C doesn't hold,  may still occur, but  won't.
The above denition relates act-types, rather than action occurrences. It is called conditional generation by
Pollack and by Balkanski, who reserve the term generation for the relation holding in the world between two
action occurrences when the corresponding act-types are related by conditional generation. The issues they
address require both notions. Our discussion of action descriptions only requires one, which we will refer to
as generation for brevity. What we will always mean when we say that a generation relation holds between 
and  is that the act-type specied by the action description  (or a renement of ) conditionally generates
the act-type specied by the action description .
Ex. (7) illustrates the generation relation, in that nothing else needs to be done after turning the screw
(counterclockwise) to achieve loosening the screw . In other cases, if  is part of a sequence of actions A to do
, generation may hold between the whole sequence A and . Ex. (8) may be interpreted as such: immerse
it in a dip is part of a sequence of actions that generate treating badly corroded brass.
Generation is a pervasive relation between action descriptions in naturally occurring data | out of 230
PC's, about 75% express generation. Most of the other clauses express enablement | discussion of the few
PC's that express neither generation nor enablement can be found in (Di Eugenio, 1993). Enablement is
dened informally as  bringing about conditions C necessary for  to be executable: this may mean either
that C are part of the executability conditions on  itself, or of the conditions under which a third action 
generates  | this denition and its formalization are due to (Balkanski, 1993).
7
Ex. (3) above is an example of enablement, in which holding the cup under the spigot brings about one of
the conditions necessary for a third action  = depress the lever to generate ll the cup with coee. Another
example is:
(10) Unscrew the protective plate to expose the box.
Unscrew the protective plate brings about one of the executability conditions on taking the plate o , which
in turn generates exposing the box .
Speakers can use pragmatic overloading when conveying either generation or enablement. Examples of
generation involving overloading are Exs. (7), in which the further constraint on  is counterclockwise, and
(8), in which the further constraint on  is dip for cleaning badly tinted brass. Examples of enablement
involving overloading are Ex. (3), in which the further constraint on  is concavity pointing upwards; and
Exs. (6), (9a) and (9c), where the further constraint does not rene , but the relation R between  and ,
and is the expectation concerning the location of one of the surface arguments of .
As we mentioned earlier, pragmatic overloading does not necessarily occur: in (10), exposing the box
places neither additional constraints on unscrewing nor expectations on the enablement relation. While it is
true that new actions that are not explicitly mentioned in the input may be inferred in this and other cases
involving enablement |  = depress the lever in (3), and  = take the plate o in (10) | we don't consider
such inferences as part of pragmatic overloading, but rather, of the concurrent necessary inferences of plan
recognition.
There are also examples of renement involving the aspectual sense of action descriptions. In
(11) If the tiles don't come up easily, warm them to soften the adhesive.
the goal  = to soften the adhesive constrains the description (and hence execution) of  = warm [the tiles]
by augmenting it with a (somewhat fuzzy) termination condition (i.e., when the adhesive becomes soft),
which a process such as warm does not intrinsically have. Its more specic termination condition { when
the adhesive becomes soft enough for the tiles to come up easily { requires additional reasoning that involves
the conditional if the tiles don't come up easily as well. As we noted earlier, the implementation discussed
in Sec. 4 does not cover this type of inference triggered by pragmatic overloading.
3.1.2 Free adjuncts
As mentioned above, there are a variety of expressions that directly convey purpose relations; among those
expressions, we want to briey discuss free adjuncts. A free adjunct is dened as a nonnite predicative
phrase with the function of an adverbial subordinate clause (Stump, 1985). It may be headed by a noun,
adjective, prepositional phrase, or verb.
8
Here we focus on free adjuncts headed by progressive gerundives,
as they are quite common in instructions { e.g., the clause in boldface in Ex. (12):
(12) Pour mixture over cheese in casserole, spreading evenly.
In gerundive adjuncts, the relation R between  (the action described in the main clause) and  (the
one described in the adjunct) is more ambiguous than in the case of Purpose Clauses. As we reported
in (Webber and Di Eugenio, 1990) with respect to a corpus of 97 free adjuncts, and veried recently on
a second corpus of 49 free adjuncts, we found three kinds of relations possible between  and : simple
augmentation, generation, or temporal relations. As with purpose clauses, when the free adjunct conveys
generation, pragmatic overloading is possible | for example,
(13) Cut the square in half creating two triangles.
The action to be performed is  = cut the square in half . However, such action description is underspecied,
in that there is an innite number of ways of cutting a square in half: the goal  = create two triangles
restricts the choice to cutting the square along one of the two diagonals, which does generate . Notice that
in the case of free adjuncts the directionality of the relation is not restricted by the syntax, as it is in Purpose
Clauses, where, when generation holds, it is always  that generates : in free adjuncts, it may be  that
generates  or  that generates .
It appears that adjuncts are not used to express enablement. This may account for why we have not
found examples of free adjuncts in which pragmatic overloading leads to additional expectations associated
with R: in fact, most expectations we have recognized arise in the context of 's that change the perceptual
space of the agent and that are related to  by enablement.
3.2 Until clauses
Utterances of the form Do  until  are common in maintenance and repair instructions. There are over 180
occurrences in (RD, 1991; McGowan and DuBern, 1991). Instructions of this form are a challenge to our
instruction animation enterprise (Sec. 2) because they require directing animated agents to attend to the
right things perceptually, as well as do the right things physically. For Natural Language Processing, such
instructions provide additional evidence for the phenomenon we are calling pragmatic overloading .
The primary function of an until clause is to specify the condition  under which an agent should
terminate the process specied in the main clause . For example, in
(14) Squeeze riveter handles until rivet stem breaks o.
the agent is meant to continue the process of squeezing the rivet until he observes that its stem has broken o.
Here process is used in Moens and Steedman's sense (1988) of a temporally-extended action with no intrinsic
culmination point, what Vendler (1967) called an activity . Since squeeze has no intrinsic culmination point,
an agent needs to determine when he or she can stop and go on to the next thing.
Pragmatic overloading only occurs in a sub-class of utterances containing until clauses: those in which
the hearer interprets  as both contributing to and controlling the termination condition . In such cases,
 will be interpreted as being done for the purpose of producing , and, as such, if  is underspecied or
ambiguous, the hearer will infer a more specic sense of  that will bring about . To see this, consider the
case where  is not interpreted as either contributing to or controlling  { e.g.,
(15) Do whatever you want until your mother gets back.
or the case where  simply contributes to but does not control  { e.g.,
(16a) Hold new xture in position with masking tape until the adhesive has set.
(16b) Let poultice stand until it dries.
In neither of these cases is the hearer led to a more specic interpretation of  because it is being done until
 comes about. In particular, since it is exposure to the air that controls setting and drying, not holding or
letting stand, the way these actions are done is not aected by their being done until the specied condition
holds.
When  is interpreted as contributing to and controlling , pragmatic overloading can occur in at least
two ways. One way is through description renement, as in Ex. (5) above and in the following Ex. (17):
(17) To make sure that all corners are square, measure diagonals AD and BC, and move stake D until
the diagonals are equal.
Because move stake D is interpreted as contributing to and controlling the diagonals becoming equal but is
underspecied with respect to the direction of movement, the hearer infers that the direction must be that
which will make the diagonals equal.
The second way that pragmatic overloading can occur is through an until clause directing the hearer to
the appropriate aspectual sense of , for example
(18) Two 2x4s, worked in opposition, can serve as levers. After loosening boulder with pick and shovel,
pry it with one 2x4, then with the other, until you can use one of the levers as a ramp to get stone
out of hole.
Here the aspectual interpretation of the main clause is not simply the two-step sequence of prying with one
2x4 and then prying with the other, but rather an iteration of this sequence until the boulder is loose enough
to roll out of its hole on one of the 2x4s.
This property, that an until adjunct, like a temporal for adverbial (e.g. for 10 minutes), only makes
sense in combination with a process specication has been observed before (Moens and Steedman, 1988;
Jackendo, 1990). But has also been observed (Moens and Steedman, 1988) that an event description can
be coerced to a process interpretation in more than one way, e.g.:
(19a) Play the Moonlight Sonata for a few minutes, just to get an idea what it sounds like.
(19b) Play the Moonlight Sonata for six hours, and then see how much you still like it.
In the rst case, the for adverbial leads to an interpretation of play the Moonlight Sonata in which only a
small fragment of the sonata will be played (i.e., it won't be played to completion). In the second case, the for
adverbial leads to a sense of iteration. It is the hearer's world knowledge of the relevant time periods involved
that leads him or her to the appropriate aspectual sense. Similarly, it is the hearer's world knowledge of how
actions contribute to and control conditions that leads the hearer to the appropriate aspectual sense of the
action description in an until clause.
We explain how this happens using Moens & Steedman's event ontology (1988). This posits a structure
called an event nucleus consisting of a preparatory process, a culmination, and a consequent state. Vendler's
accomplishment corresponds to a complete nucleus, while his non-durative achievement corresponds to a
nucleus minus a preparatory process and his atelic activity consists only of a preparatory process without
culmination or consequent state.
Now hearers know that actions can contribute to and control conditions in dierent ways. For example,
a condition  can be the cumulative result of a repeated action, as in Ex. (18) above or the result of repeated
attempts at an action, each of which has some probability of producing , as in
(20) Try sample specks on the piece until you get a good match, wiping them away each time until you
nd the right colour.
In such cases, given an instruction of the form Do  until , if the hearer takes  as being the cumulative
result of repeated instances of  or the result of repeated attempts at , each of which has some probability
of producing , then the hearer will interpret  as an iterative process, as in Ex. (18) above.
Alternatively, condition  can be the result of some unspecied process that can only take place in a
state that the specied action  is capable of bringing about; then,  will be interpreted in terms of the
process of maintaining the consequent state it brings about. The intended interpretation of Ex. (21) is that
the agent should turn o the iron and maintain it in that state while the ambient room temperature acts to
cool it down:
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(21) If solder gets runny or if iron smokes, turn o iron until it cools a bit.
There is a third type of aspectual coercion occurring with until clauses that occurs only rarely and is
illustrated by the following (constructed) example:
(22) Play \Tenderly" until you get to the part you're having trouble with, then call me and I'll come help.
Here, playing a specic composition denotes an entire event nucleus, consisting of preparatory process,
culmination and consequent state. Yet the interpretation of  here is as an initial sub-sequence of the
preparatory process. We speculate that this will happen when a preparatory process is viewed as leading
cumulatively to condition  before the culmination is reached.
The work described in this section is in a more preliminary stage than the work on purpose clauses,
so we can only speculate on the knowledge representation and reasoning needed to support the particular
inference patterns mentioned here. (Other knowledge will be needed as well for relating an agent's knowledge
of possible ways of assessing  { simple perception vs. \active" perception { to the agent's knowledge of
ways of doing , thereby producing an integrated action complex that accomplishes both  and perhaps
repeated assessment of .) Clearly causal knowledge will be needed to relate actions with their eventual,
cumulative, or non-deterministic results. In addition, knowledge will be needed of processes, the states that
support them and their time-varying eects. Because such knowledge will serve other roles as well in both
text understanding and planning, postulating their eventual availability is not so far-fetched.
4 Reasoning and representation
Here, we will discuss the inferences arising in the context of pragmatic overloading from a computational
point of view. Approaching pragmatic overloading from a computational point of view does not only involve
designing an algorithm, but also providing a knowledge representation formalism that can support such
inferences.
The algorithm we have implemented can only handle purpose expressions relating actions: it cannot
relate an action to a condition it is being done to bring about, as in so that and until adjuncts; and it cannot
recognize purpose when it is indirectly conveyed in expressions such as until clauses. Thus, the algorithm
accepts instructions of the form Do  < for the purpose of > doing :
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<for the purpose of> can either be
conveyed explicitly by to, so as to, in order to, or implicitly by adjacency. The algorithm will then try to
nd the connection between  and , by exploiting the fact that  describes the goal to be achieved.
A second limitationof the algorithm is that it is not able to recognize relations between actions that are not
somehow derivable from the underlying prior knowledge. Our current algorithm can compute renements
of action descriptions and expectations if it can recognize that the instructor means to convey a specic
generation or enablement relation already known to the agent: it does not yet learn new generation or
enablement relations, or recognize temporal relations. For example, if Ex. (12) is interpreted as  = pour
mixture over cheese in casserole generating  = spreading [mixture] evenly and we don't have any previous
knowledge about pouring a mixture in such a manner as to spread it evenly, we won't be able to recognize
such generation relation and thus we won't be able to compute any contingent renements. While this is
clearly a shortcoming of our current approach, we believe we have laid down some solid foundations that
will support the implementation of more complex inference processes in the future.
4.1 The formalism
There are two issues that have been implicitly raised in our discussion so far and that motivate our approach
to represent action descriptions.
 The same action can be described in a variety of ways. In the same text, even on the same page,
the instructor may use dierent descriptions to refer to the same action to be performed in the world.
Examples from (McGowan and DuBern, 1991) are:
(23a) (p. 62) Use masking tape to hold them [each piece] in position.
(23b) (p. 63) Secure each piece in place with masking tape.
(24a) (p. 179) Turn on the tap to drain away the water in the pipe.
(24b) (p. 179) Open the tap to drain the pipe.
Our perspective is that we should try to capture as many variations with as few mechanisms as possible;
in this paper, we present one of them.
 Talking about the \same" action described in dierent ways presupposes that for every action there is
a canonical description that we can use as the anchor . This canonical description can be considered
as the representative of the equivalence class of all equivalent descriptions for a certain action | the
representative can be chosen on the practical grounds of what is best suited for the processing that the
system performs. Intuitively, there is such a distinction between \external" action descriptions and the
\internal" knowledge about actions the agent has. Whatever form this knowledge has | and certainly
we don't intend to make any cognitive claims in this respect | the problem arises of reconciling the
\external" form of the instruction with the agent's \internal" knowledge. Clearly, an important part
of the problem is not to infer equivalence when it does not exist. The problem is made more dicult
by the fact that the \external" description may be totally new to the agent.
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Shieber (1993) makes a similar point as regards generation systems. He points out that the strategic
reasoner | the module of the system that decides what to say | may employ a logical-form language
in which there may exist several representations of any given meaning of a certain string; at the same
time, the grammar in the tactical generator | the module that decides how to express a certain
meaning | will presumably pair only one such representation, called canonical logical form, with that
string. Shieber points out that thus the problem of computing the equivalence of any two logical forms
arises, and convincingly argues that
either the strategic component will have to perform linguistic reasoning, or the interface
representation language together with the tactical component will constitute a solution to
the AI problem.
Clearly, we do not claim to have solved the problem; rather, we provide a step towards the solu-
tion, by supplying a knowledge representation formalism exible enough to support comparing action
descriptions one to the other in a perspicuous way.
These two characteristics, the variability of \external" descriptions, and the need to reconcile \external"
and \internal" descriptions, led us to two specic choices in our representation formalism: adopting a lexical
semantics approach to the representation of verbs, and embedding our representation in a description logic
based system (once called hybrid systems or systems based on terminological logics).
A decompositional approach to the lexical semantics of verbs (Jackendo, 1990; Levin and Rappaport
Hovav, 1992; Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995) focuses attention on components of meaning that aect
both surface behavior and interpretation, and allows us to capture some descriptional variations: more
importantly, it helps us infer whether two descriptions describe the \same" action, in particular by blocking
potentially wrong inferences. For example, (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995) postulate a fundamental
dichotomy between manner/means verbs, such as wipe and stab, and result verbs, such as remove and kill .
The location-as-object variant is possible only with (some) manner/means verbs, and not with result verbs,
as exemplied in (25) and (26) (from (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1992)).
(25a) Wipe the ngerprints from the counter.
(25b) Wipe the counter .
(26a) Remove the groceries from the bag.
(26b) Remove the bag .
While (25a) and (25b) may describe the same action, (26b), while a grammatical English sentence, can't have
the same meaning as (26a). Notice however that nothing in the surface structure of the descriptions allows
the inference from (25a) to (25b) and prevents the identical one from (26a) to (26b). Only by dierentiating
between these two classes of verbs via their lexical semantic representations can we ensure that inferences
are allowed and prevented in accordance to the facts. Moreover, the importance of the manner/means
components of meaning is also shown by the abundance of modiers expressing them, such as evenly in (12),
in NL instructions.
Other descriptional variations are captured by the description logic based system (DLBS) we use, CLAS-
SIC (Brachman et al., 1991). The choice of a DLBS neither happened by chance nor is simply motivated
by implementation concerns:
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a DLBS provides appropriate Knowledge Representation tools to support
an algorithm that must compare dierent action descriptions, and deal with those that are not known to
the system. The basic representation in a DLBS is a virtual lattice of concepts, action descriptions in our
case, based on the partial order induced by subsumption. Subsumption captures hierarchical relation be-
tween action descriptions, and concept classication, the algorithm that computes subsumption, provides
the appropriate inferential basis to deal with dierent action descriptions.
The reasoning required to deal with pragmatic overloading also requires representing other relations
between actions, including generation, enablement , substep, qualier and eect . For this, our formalism
consists of two components, the Action Taxonomy and the Plan Library , both implemented in CLASSIC. The
Action Taxonomy stores lexical semantic knowledge about actions, using primitives derived from Jackendo's
decompositional approach to the lexical semantics of verbs (1990; 1991). The action terms dened in the
Action Taxonomy are the components of the recipes, i.e. common sense plans about actions (Pollack, 1990),
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stored in the Plan Library. The recipes in the Plan Library are the knowledge the system has about actually
planning.
We are not claiming that we are able to recognize every descriptional variant of an action. For example,
the two descriptions skillet on the stove and skillet in the kitchen may refer to the same object, but are
not simply descriptional variants. Understanding their relationship requires spatial reasoning, which the
current implementation carries out in an ad hoc manner. However, we do believe that the two conceptual
components we have chosen, lexical semantics and DLBS, provide the core of an appropriate representation
system, to which other representation and reasoning systems are joined | see Sec. 4.2.
4.1.1 The Action Taxonomy
Some elements that we use to represent the lexical semantics of verbs
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were drawn from Jackendo's
Conceptual Semantics | CS for short (1990; 1991). We found CS useful for the following reasons. First
of all, CS provides a link between surface form and semantics as discussed above with respect to Exs. (25)
and (26). A related point is that the CS primitives capture generalizations about action descriptions and
reveal more of their relationships to one another, such as that carry is move object augmented with a specic
physical means of moving the object. This makes them suitable for a hierarchical representation. Second,
CS representations are particularly amenable to expressing the logical form of an instruction, as in general
they reveal where information may be missing from an utterance and must be provided by inference; and
in particular, they are well suited as the semantic representation associated to the Combinatory Categorial
Grammar used by AnimNL's parser (White, 1992).
A CS entity may be of ontological type Thing, Place, Path, Event, State, Manner or Property .
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The
CS for a library is shown in (27):
(27) [
Thing
library]
k
Square brackets indicate an entity of type Thing the enclosed featural description. Indexes such as k , which
we will often omit for the sake of readability, are used to distinguish instances of a type.
CS's may also contain complex features generated by conceptual functions over other CS's. The concep-
tual function IN: Thing ! Place is used to represent the location in the library as shown in (28a) below.
Likewise, the function TO: Place! Path describes a path that ends in the specied place, see (28b). Finally,
by adding GO: Thing  Path ! Event, we obtain the representation for Go into the library , as shown in
(28c):
(28a) [
Place
IN([
Thing
library]
k
)]
l
(28b) [
Path
TO([
Place
IN([
Thing
library]
k
)]
l
)]
m
(28c) [
Event
GO
Sp
([you]
i
, [
Path
TO([IN([library]
k
)]
l
)]
m
)
An important notion in CS is that of semantic eld , i.e., the semantic domain to which a certain primitive
applies. For example, a CS primitive like GO embodies the concept of change of state, and the semantic eld
species in which domain the change takes place: it can be a change of location as in (28c) (Sp stands for
Spatial), or a change of ownership as in (29) (Poss for Possessional), which represents part of the meaning
of a sentence such as Bill bought a watch.
(29) [GO
Poss
([watch], [TO([AT([bill])])])]
In AnimNL we introduced a new semantic eld, called Control (Ctrl), intended to represent the notion of
having control over some object, relevant to any action involving direct physical manipulation. For example
in sports, the meanings of having the ball , getting the ball , and losing the ball embody this notion. Ex. (30)
illustrates both the similarity and the dierence between Jack has the money (Possessional) and Jack has
the ball (Control):
(30a) [BE
Poss
([money], [AT([jack])])]
(30b) [BE
Ctrl
([ball], [AT([jack])])]
CS's are readily integrated into CLASSIC, as shown in Figs. 3, 4 and 5, that present part of the Action
Taxonomy in our system. As customary in graphical representations of KB's based on DLBS's, ellipses
represent concepts; small circles encircling squares represent roles, i.e. relations between concepts: the
numbers in parentheses, such as (1,1) represent the arity of the relation; and diamonds containing the '='
sign represent constraints that impose equality of role llers | this is the restricted type of structural map,
namely, of relation between llers of dierent roles, that CLASSIC allows.
Some comments on the elements in the gures are in order.
Entity. The taxonomy rooted in entity is similar to others used in other KB's.
Place. This subhierarchy encodes conceptual functions of the form F: Thing ! Place, such as AT, IN, ON.
There are dierent kinds of places and paths corresponding to dierent semantic elds.
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In Fig. 3, only
the concept spatial-place, and its subordinate at-sp-place, corresponding to the AT conceptual function, are
shown. at-sp-place has a single role at-role with exactly one ller, of type Entity .
Path. Concepts belonging to this subhierarchy represent functions yielding Paths. Consider from-to-path-
sp(atial), dened by means of multiple inheritance from to-path-sp and from-path-sp. from-to-path-sp has
inanimate 
geometric
figure
triangle
at-sp-place
control-path
animate 
entity
SAME-AS
square
geometric
concept
place path
from-to-path-sp
from(at)-to-path-sp
circular-path-sp
spatial-path
place
spatial-
to-path-control
(1,1)
at-role
from-path-sp to-path-sp
destination
(1,1)
source
(1,1)
Figure 3: Parts of the Entity, Place and Path Hierarchies
cause
inanimate 
event
(1,1)
patient
go
(1,1)
animate 
caused-role
act-type
cause-and-acton
act-on
(1,1)
experiencer
(1,1)
agent
SAME-AS
transitive closure
subsumption
go-sp-circ
entity
screw
clockwise
(1,1)
directioncounter-
restricts
patient to
screwrestricts
caused-role
screw-cc
turn-
Figure 4: Part of the Action Hierarchy
go-sp-circ
cause
event
go
act-on
cause-and-acton
screw-cc
turn- reduce
to-pieces
cut square
transitive closure
subsumption
(1,1)
caused-role
act-type
go-spatial go-control
move
sth-swh
loosen
screw
wash
cause
property-change
Figure 5: Some actions in the Action Hierarchy
two roles, source and destination, each of which has a ller spatial-place. The concept from(at)-to-path-sp
restricts the role source inherited from from-to-path-sp to be lled by at-sp-place.
Event. Fig. 4 shows part of the event subhierarchy. The intuitive notion of action corresponds to the concept
cause-and-acton.
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To avoid cluttering the gure, some restrictions on cause-and-acton are not shown:
namely, cause-and-acton restricts the two roles agent inherited from cause and experiencer inherited from
act-on to have the same ller; analogously, patient inherited from cause and experiencer inherited from
cause via caused-role are restricted to have the same ller, as shown in the following CLASSIC denition:
(cl-define-concept 'cause-and-acton
'(and cause act-on
(same-as agent experiencer)
(same-as patient (caused-role experiencer))))
turn-screw-cc| for turn screw counterclockwise | is dened as a subconcept of cause-and-acton by imposing
the restriction that the ller of the caused-role be go-sp-circ, namely, an act-type of type go-spatial , with
a role path-role restricted to be circular-path-sp. The experiencer role on go-sp-circ is the turned object,
i.e. the concept screw restricting the patient role on turn-screw-cc. The denition of turn-screw-cc exactly
corresponds to its CS representation, shown as the body in Fig. 10. Finally, Fig. 5 is a schematic version of
a portion of the event subhierarchy, that includes 44 concepts | move-sth-swh stands for move something
somewhere. cause-property-change is the root of the subhierarchy which includes actions that change a
property of an object. Consistent with Jackendo's terminology, the semantic eld Ident icational refers to
properties: for example, clean and dirty in Fig. 7, and loose and tight in Fig. 10 are values of the Ident
eld. CS's such as AT([dirty]) in Fig. 7 represents \places" within the Ident semantic eld.
While the choices of CS's and of DLBS's were independently motivated, they reciprocally benet from
their integration: the usage in the KB of linguistically sound primitives is a rst step towards providing a
real lexicon; on the other hand, a representation based on description logic makes it possible to use CS's
in a computational framework, by endowing it with a hierarchical organization and with the possibility of
extending the lexicon.
Before closing, we note that in our use of a DLBS, we are not distinguishing between the T-Box, the
repository of terminological knowledge, and the A-Box, used to represent the individual instances of the
concepts. There are two reasons for this. First, CLASSIC does not really distinguish between T-Box and
A-Box, as the same language is used to dene concepts and individuals. Second, while both the Action
Taxonomy and the Plan Library make use of CLASSIC terminological components to the fullest, we use the
\A-Box" in a limited way: we simply create the individual actions that correspond to the action descriptions
in input, and exploit CLASSIC's subsumption mechanism to understand of which concepts they are instances.
4.1.2 The Plan Library
As mentioned above, the second component of our formalism, the Plan Library, contains planning knowledge
in the form of simple recipes, and is implemented in CLASSIC as well; thus, classication is used to maintain
an organized KB of action recipes.
The syntax of the recipes is described in Fig. 6, and two examples of recipes, which respectively illustrate
a method for washing an object and for loosening a screw , are shown in Figs. 7 and 10; these two gures
are expressed in CS terms rather than as a CLASSIC concept for readability. The terminals that are not
relations in Fig. 6 | basic-act-type, act-type, state | are concepts belonging to the Action Taxonomy, and
thus indicate type restrictions on components of the recipes. ACHIEVE in Fig. 7 maps a state into an action
that achieves that state.
RECIPE ! BASIC-RECIPE j NON-BASIC-RECIPE
BASIC-RECIPE ! BASIC-HEADER QUALIFIER

EFFECT
+
NON-BASIC-RECIPE ! HEADER BODY
QUALIFIER

EFFECT
+
BASIC-HEADER ! basic-act-type
HEADER ! act-type
BODY ! act-type
+
ANNOTATION

ANNOTATION ! act-type
1
enables act-type
2
j
act-type
1
TEMP-REL act-type
2
QUALIFIER ! state
EFFECT ! state
TEMP-REL ! precedes j before j meets ...
Figure 6: The Recipe BNF
Header
[CAUSE([agent]
i
; [GO
ident
(j;k)])]

TO([AT([clean])])

k
Body
- [ACHIEVE(i, BE
Sp
(i, [AT([washing-site])]))]

1
- [ACHIEVE(i, BE
Sp
(j, [AT([washing-site])]))]

2
- [PHYSICAL-WASH(i, j, [AT([washing-site])])]

3
- Annotations -
- 
1
enables 
3
- 
2
enables 
3
Qualiers
- [BE
Ident
(j, AT([dirty]))]
Eects
- [BE
ident
(j, AT([clean]))]
Figure 7: A Wash Recipe
Recipes have a header , body , qualiers and eects. The terminology, especially header and body , is
reminiscent of STRIPS, but the relations between these components are expressed in terms of enablement
and generation, e.g. the body generates its header.
The distinction between basic-recipe and non-basic-recipe is due to the need of providing the base case
Given Do  for the purpose of doing ,
(31a) using  as an index into the plan library, nd a collection of recipes M
l
that achieve ;
(31b) match  to an action 
l;j
that appears in the body ofM
l
;
(31c) choose the best matchingM
l
.
Figure 8: High level description of the algorithm
of the representation, namely, of dening basic act-types. It is a notoriously dicult problem to dene what
a basic act-type is | cf. (Pollack, 1986, p.59). For the purpose of this paper, we will assume that CS Event
functions that don't have another event as argument are basic: this implies that all the act-types which are
descendants of GO are basic. Moreover, those action types that, as discussed above, cannot be distinguished
solely on the basis of their CS representations, such as PHYSICAL-WASH in Fig. 7, are left as basic: it is
AnimNL that provides the corresponding decomposition into lower level actions.
The representation does not employ preconditions, and thus, action recipes express a part of what is
traditionally expressed by means of preconditions by means of actions, which are substeps in the body that
generates a certain header. Other functions that preconditions have been used for, such as ordering substeps
in a plan, can be performed by means of the annotations on the body, that specify the relations between
the subactions, e.g. enablement and temporal relations. One of the reasons behind the choice of not having
preconditions is the fact that NL instructions generally describe an action , rather than 's eects: thus a
representation focused on substeps rather than on preconditions keeps the mapping process between surface
form and stored knowledge more direct. Another reason for not having preconditions is the diculty of
distinguishing between preconditions and substeps in the body of an action. See (Di Eugenio, 1993; Webber
et al., 1992) for further details.
Qualiers are those conditions on actions that must hold for an action to be relevant, and are not meant
to be achieved. Procedurally, qualiers don't give rise to subgoaling. Finally, a recipe has eects, what must
be true after an action has been executed.
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Finally, there may be many recipes with the same header, e.g. the recipe in Fig. 7 is just one of those
possible for washing an object: for example, another one (that we haven't included in our system yet) could
describe washing an object by having another agent, possibly a professional, wash it.
This denition of recipes can be translated quite directly into CLASSIC | see (Di Eugenio, 1993) for
further details.
4.2 The algorithm
At a high level, our algorithm can be described as in Fig. 8. The inferences due to pragmatic overloading
occur during step (31b): the renement of  to 
0
is performed by means of a exible match between  and

l;j
, which is one of the actions that appear in the recipe that achieves . Notice that instead step (31a) can
be considered as belonging to plan recognition inferences, in that one of its side eects is that new actions,
not mentioned in the input | namely, the ones belonging to M
l
| may be included in the agent's plan.
Discussion of the third step of the algorithm (31c) can be found in (Di Eugenio, 1993).
The inferences performed in steps (31a) and (31b) all exploit CLASSIC subsumption through its classier.
Step (31a) is performed by retrieving recipes of whose header  is an instance. Step (31b) can be concisely
described as checking the characteristics of the concept (and 
conc

l;j
), where 
conc
is the most specic,
possibly virtual concept of which  is an instance.
Although the algorithm in Fig. 8 may appear quite abstract, it is embedded in AnimNL in the modules
labeled plan graph initialization and plan inference, as shown in Fig. 9. Instructions are given to AnimNL
in steps consisting of one or more utterances. A step species a continuous behavior that the agent must
attend to. Steps are processed by a parser (White, 1992) based on Combinatory Categorial Grammar, and
that produces a logical form LF. The LF for the current step is incrementally developed into the plan graph,
which is composed of nodes that contain descriptions of individual actions, and edges that denote relations
between these actions. The algorithm in Fig. 8 has as input the LF produced by the parser, which is expressed
in terms of CLASSIC individuals, one for each for the main clause and for each adjunct clause, plus the
necessary connectives. As regards purpose expressions, the algorithm we have so far (which obviously can
interpret also simple main clauses, even if the description in Fig. 8 is tailored towards purpose expressions)
assumes that the goal  has been identied: this is straightforward for Purpose Clauses, where  is explicit;
the goal can be easily recognized in certain cases of until clauses, in which the condition  is stated in the
passive form | e.g. until the screw is loosened | or with a modal, either active or passive | e.g. until
you can remove the tile or until the tile can be removed . However, this assumption is too strong to hold in
general for until clauses, and doesn't work for free adjuncts, which, as we saw, don't necessarily convey a
purposive relation. Heuristics can help: for example when a free adjunct is headed by a verb such as create
in (13), make, form, it is plausible that the free adjunct expresses a goal. Clearly, heuristics won't solve the
whole problem, and more sophisticated search strategies are necessary.
The algorithm in Fig. 8 models the commitments the agent adopts simply based on the input instruction
and the stored knowledge and produces a rst pass of the plan graph, that is further developed by processes
of reference resolution; plan expansion | e.g. if the plan calls for moving from one room to another, this step
will insert a step open door if the door between the two rooms is closed; referent nding | the referent in the
world for a certain referring expression may not be immediately available, e.g. in Get me a soda the soda will
presumably be in the fridge; object specic reasoning | verbs are often underspecied with respect to the
geometric characteristics of the object: e.g. open is used both for open a can of paint and open the door , but
the movements that realize these two actions are quite diverse. When a commitment to act for a particular
purpose, e.g. goto(door1, open(door1)) \go to door1 for the purpose of opening it", becomes suciently
specied for the agent to be ready to commit to it and temporal dependencies permit such commitment,
other, low-level planning processes are triggered. The output of these processes is a collection of behaviors
to be executed (simulated) in parallel, or an indication that the agent's \body" is unable to carry out the
behavior.
A nal remark on our KB and algorithm: both the Action Taxonomy and the Plan Library are small-
scale knowledge bases. Scaling them up, while requiring more sophisticated indexing and search, will not,
we believe, aect the basic algorithm.
We will now illustrate how the inferences about rening action descriptions are computed by step (31b).
Space constraints prevent us from illustrating how the Contribute relation is rened by means of expectations
| the interested reader is referred to (Di Eugenio, 1993).
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Figure 9: AnimNL System Architecture
4.2.1 Rening action descriptions
Let's consider Ex. (7), Turn screw to loosen. As we discussed above,  = Turn screw is underspecied in
that the direction in which to turn the screw is missing; the goal  = to loosen provides such direction
as counterclockwise (under the assumption the screw is right threaded). Notice that there are a very large
number of ways of expressing such an instruction; four of them are listed in (32), where (7) is repeated as
(32b):
19
(32a) [To loosen the screw]

1
, [turn it counterclockwise with the big screwdriver]

1
.
(32b) [Turn the screw]

2
[to loosen]

2
.
(32c) [To loosen the screw]

3
, [turn it with the big screwdriver]

3
.
(32d) [Turn the screw clockwise]

4
[to loosen]

4
.
Now, in all cases apart from (32a), 
i
undergoes some renement, brought about by 
i
through the match
with 
l;j
,  for short | in this case, the only step in the body of the recipe in Fig. 10.
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Such recipe is
retrieved by step (31a) for each of the cases in (32). Step (31b) is implemented by asking the following
queries in succession, stopping as soon as a positive answer is found | 
conc
is the most specic, possibly
virtual concept of which  is an instance.
(33a) (and 
conc
)
?
= 
conc
, i.e., does  subsume 
conc
?
(33b) (and 
conc
)
?
= , i.e., does 
conc
subsume ?
(33c) (coherent (and 
conc
)), i.e, do 
conc
and  have a common subsumee?
Header
[CAUSE(i;GO
ident
(screw
j
; k))]

FROM(AT(tight))
TO(AT(loose))

k
Body

CAUSE(i;GO
sp
(j; n))
[DIRECTION(counterclockwise)]



FROM(m)
TO(m)

n
Eects
[BE
ident
(j, AT([loose))]
Figure 10: The recipe for loosen screw
1. In (32a), 
1
is more specic than  in the recipe, and thus undergoes no renements: 
0
1
= 
1
. However,
this is established only after the added modier with the big screwdriver is checked for consistency
with : this is veried by (33a) that returns a positive answer.
2. In (32b), 
2
is more abstract than . However, only  is specied enough to achieve 
2
, thus 
2
is
rened to 
0
2
= . This is illustrated in Fig. 11. 
conc
2
, the virtual concept of which 
2
is an instance,
is an ancestor of : thus 
0
2
is inferred by (33b) to be an instance of , with the roles common to 
and to 
conc
2
lled with the llers from 
2
.
subsumption
virtual
2α
cause-and-acton
turn-cc
caused-role
counter-clockwise
concept
virtual
individualinstance-of
2α
γ
conc
turn-screw-cc
turn-screw
turn
turn-direction
go-sp-circ
direction
Figure 11: A less specic turn
3. In (32c), with regard to , 
3
lacks the direction of rotation, but adds the instrument modier with the
big screwdriver , compatible with everything else we know about  and . In this case, (33c) veries
whether (and 
conc
3
) is coherent: as it is, 
0
3
is taken to be an instance of this latter virtual concept,
with the roles inherited from 
conc
3
lled with the llers on 
3
.
4. In (32d), 
4
is inconsistent with , as found out by (33c), and no 
0
4
is admissible | see Fig. 12. The
value restrictions of the role direction on the two concepts are respectively counterclockwise and
clockwise, two concepts dened as disjoint and thus incoherent. Clearly, the incoherence of (32d)
depends on the available knowledge. Suppose that the system also has a recipe M
left
about left
subsumption
virtual
cause-and-acton
turn-cc
caused-role
concept
virtual
instance-of individual
restricts
γ
turn-screw-cc
turn
turn-direction
go-sp-circ
direction
(1,1)
direction
counter
clockwise clockwise
conc
α4
α4
clockwise
turn-screw-
direction
Figure 12: An incoherent turn
handed screws, that loosen in the opposite way. 
4
| and so all the other 
i
in (32) | would then
select bothM
left
andM
right
(the recipe in Fig. 10). As a consequence, 
4
, rather than being deemed
incoherent, would be found compatible with the  in the body of M
left
: the matching step could in
fact be used to select the right recipe. This is a plan recognition type inference, that our algorithm
is able to perform, but that we don't discuss any further in this paper because it does not belong to
pragmatic overloading.
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5 Conclusion
There are two things we would like to do in this nal section: re-iterate our main point and indicate how
our research is currently proceeding. We start with the latter.
As we already noted, we do not currently carry out any reasoning from conditions to the actions that
control their coming about. This capability will be needed for at least two purposes: to interpret so that and
until adjuncts in general and to derive renements due to pragmatic overloading of these adjuncts in partic-
ular. Animating instructions containing until adjuncts also requires knowledge of the actions and resources
used in assessing these conditions, since termination condition assessment actions must be appropriately
integrated with the main action the agent is instructed to carry out. This is discussed in somewhat more
detail in (Webber, 1995).
Reasoning about the nature of the process that an agent must carry out until some condition holds
also requires a ner-grained representation of action than one usually nds in action representations for AI
planning and certainly one ner-grained than that which we are currently using. One that suggests itself is
Steedman's version of the situation calculus (1995), which can capture both process termination and action
culmination. We are currently looking into a mapping between the parallel transition networks (PaT-Nets)
that serve as an executable high-level specication for animation in Jack (Becket and Badler, 1993; Badler
et al., 1995) and Steedman's representation. Both are process-oriented, and the mapping would support the
ability to reason in Steedman's representation and execute a corresponding set of PaT-Nets (possibly with
an optimizing stage mediating the two, to eliminate unnecessary actions and ensure smoother movement).
Work on the matching step (31b) in Fig. 8, to integrate spatial reasoning with CLASSIC-style subsump-
tion, is also part of our future plans when resources become available.
It would also be benecial to consider pragmatic overloading from the point of view of language generation
and try to relate it to previous work on generating referential noun phrases (NP), where content becomes
included in an NP for purposes other than picking out the speaker's intended referent (Appelt, 1985).
In closing, we want to re-iterate our take-home point: the current view of \language as action" leads us to
consider analogous mechanisms in the two. In the case of action, Pollack has called attention to cases where
intentions are overloaded to achieve multiple goals. This suggests similar mechanisms in language. We have
tried to show how one such mechanism, which we have called pragmatic overloading , might work, illustrating
it with examples of purpose clauses, free adjuncts and until clauses. We believe our work highlights the value
of instructions as a source of data in studies of Natural Language pragmatics: in short, they provide a well-
dened basis (i.e., what you need to know in order to act appropriately) for Gricean judgements of relevance
and reasoning triggered by relevance (Wilson and Sperber, 1986).
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Notes
1
We will use the terms speaker or instructor for the agent issuing the instructions, and hearer or agent for
the agent carrying them out. For ease of exposition, we will use feminine pronouns to refer to the speaker,
and masculine ones to refer to the hearer.
2
(Suppes and Crangle, 1988) have also talked about implicit constraints on procedure execution associated
with instructions:
Expressed intentions carry with them a bundle of ceteris paribus conditions that impose a variety
of constraints on the specic procedures actually executed. [p. 319]
They have not, however, taken the same direction as we have, to derive some of these ceteris paribus
conditions in constrained ways from a combination of lexical semantics and knowledge about acting in the
world.
3
We are not using the term purpose clause in the technical way it has been used in syntax, where it refers
to innitival to clauses adjoined to NPs. In contrast, the innitival clauses we have concentrated on are
adjoined to a matrix clause, and are termed rationale clauses in syntax; in fact all the data we will discuss
in this paper belong to a particular subclass of such clauses, subject-gap rationale clauses.
4
In general, action descriptions are underspecied in many respects; as we discussed in Sec. 1, the ad-
ditional components of meaning that we illustrate in this paper crucially depend on the goal  that 
contributes to. There may be other additional components of meaning which are relevant to the execution of
, e.g. the amount of force to apply to the screw in (7). Those relevant component of meanings that are not
computed by inferences derived from pragmatic overloading are derived by other modules of the AnimNL
system, see Sec. 4.2.
5
 = Treat badly corroded brass is underspecied in itself, as treat could mean many dierent things:
however, this instruction belongs to a section of (RD, 1991) that deals with cleaning metals.
6
It is true that, because of the uniqueness presupposition associated with denite referential NP's, (9a)
implies that there is only one Italian dictionary in the library; however, the same expectation would arise if
the NP were indenite.
7
A point similar to the distinction between conditional generation versus generation needs to be made
for conditional enablement versus enablement .
8
Constructions headed by subordinating conjunctions and containing a nonnite verb, such as while
ghting in France, he was taken prisoner are not considered to be free adjuncts by Stump (1985), who calls
them augmented adjuncts.
9
The above analysis diers from one given in (Moens and Steedman, 1988), where it is suggested that
the combination of a for temporal adverbial with an achievement, as in
(34) John left the room for a half hour.
expresses intention rather than duration, observing that Ex. (34) would be true even if John is only out
of the room for an instant, returning immediately to get his umbrella. A similar analysis does not seem
appropriate for the until clauses given above.
10
We are slightly abusing our own notation here. Up to now we have been using  to denote the action
description in the main clause, and  to denote the action description in the adjunct. Under this interpreta-
tion, and by saying that the algorithm interprets instructions of the form Do  \for the purpose of" doing
, it follows that the action in the adjunct, , is the goal: this is not necessarily true in free adjuncts. For
the sake of brevity, we will keep using Do  <for the purpose of> doing , but the reader should keep the in
mind that in the case of free adjuncts the input to the algorithm may be Do  <for the purpose of> doing
.
11
Basically, the terms \external" and \internal" refer to the input surface form, that for us includes the
logical form, and to the (semantic / world) knowledge an agent has about actions: these two terms are used
here to highlight the fact that there is often a mismatch between the two kinds of knowledge.
12
Our choice of DLBS, CLASSIC as opposed to e.g. LOOM (MacGregor and Burstein, 1991), was deter-
mined by practical considerations such as ready availability, ease of installation, eciency, etc. Thus, we are
not advocating CLASSIC in particular, but rather, DLBS's in general.
13
We are using the term recipe in the sense of Pollack's distinction between recipes and plans (1990):
recipes are what an agent knows about how to perform a certain action or achieve a certain goal, while plans
are what an agent adopts in order to act. An agent may know the recipe about how to rob a bank, without
ever adopting it as one of his plans.
14
So far we have concentrated on action representation, and we don't deal with issues related to the
representation of object descriptions.
15
This taxonomy is based on (Jackendo, 1990). (Jackendo, 1991) adds Time and Amount to the
ontological types.
16
In CLASSIC the semantic eld is represented by dening a role semfield-role | not shown in the
gures | whose value restriction is the concept semeld dened by enumeration.
17
Such denition is used to maintain the distinction between the thematic and action tiers that Jackendo
argues for in (1990).
18
We don't expect recipes to be complete, as in general neither the qualier nor the eect list is exhaustive:
they both merely list some necessary conditions. We refer the reader to e.g. (Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987)
for discussion of the related issues of the qualication and frame problems in AI.
19
The really occurring example is (32b); the PC is preposed or not according to the \heaviness" of the
main clause | see (Vander Linden and Martin, 1995).
20
Such recipe also illustrates the lack of aspectual knowledge in our representation: the facts that turn
counterclockwise may need to be repeated more than once, and that loosen screw is a process that may have
dierent culminations, as a screw may be more or less loosened, are missing.
21
Clearly, if the system's knowledge includes both M
left
and M
right
, all of the other examples in (32)
will also yield dierent results: (32a) will still select M
right
, while (32b) and (32c) do not provide enough
information by themselves to select either recipe.
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